Rowan Bosworth-Davies an Ex- Metropolitan detective specialized in Financial crime who has been on Max Keiser’s show many times to talk about how the London Banking system has become the center of the Organized crime syndicate called the City. Here is what he has to say:
This is the second tranche of the evidence I sent in to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking which they sought to suppress.
Identifying the reluctant regulator.
17. It has started to become clear that those persons who are employed in the compliance function in the industry itself do not wish to be perceived to be effective in ‘policing’ terms or are not encouraged by their employers to become so.
18. The problems which have always caused financial regulators the greatest degree of difficulty are those which stemmed from behaviour which was manifestly ‘criminal’, whether obvious or submerged. The first kind of criminal activity can be determined by those acts involving insider dealing, money laundering, the theft of client’s funds or the obtaining of money from investors by deception. The second group includes behavior which becomes criminal as a result of its commission (the trader who executes false trades or makes up positions in order to cover up his own ineptitude, or to give the impression he has achieved certain targets.) In so doing he commits offences of Fraud, and stands to be prosecuted in exactly the same way as a person who makes a false claim for State Benefit.
19.Unhappily, those given the greatest degree of responsibility for ensuring compliance with the rules and regulations , and who have the role of investigating and identifying any criminogenic behaviour, have, in the vast majority of cases, no previous experience of investigating criminal offences and appear to possess no obvious skills or ability to perform an effective policing function, and more importantly, no desire so to do, nor are they apparently willing to adopt ‘policing’ techniques or methods.
20.This unwillingness to be observed to be performing a policing function has begun to impact very heavily on the effectiveness of the regulatory role, to the extent that it has begun to become counter-productive. A detailed re-evaluation of attitudes and responses has defined an alternative interpretation which could be placed upon the reasons which apparently lie behind the bland, constantly-rehearsed assertions that other, non-policing techniques could be adopted more usefully to regulate the financial sector. A hidden agenda begins to be glimpsed, one which positively discriminates against the adoption of any methods or skills which, while they might have proved to be effective against the activities of working-class criminals in the past, are positively discouraged when it came to dealing with the crimes of the powerful.